Project ambidexterity: case of recovering schedule delay in a brownfield airport project in India by K. Chandrashekhar Iyer & Partha S. Banerjee
 Organization, Technology and Management in Construction 2017; 8: 1–18
Research Article Open Access
K. Chandrashekhar Iyer* and Partha S. Banerjee
Project ambidexterity: case of recovering schedule 
delay in a brownfield airport project in India
DOI 10.1515/otmcj-2016-0012  
Received October 2, 2016; accepted November 23, 2016
Abstract: Planning deficiencies and consequent execu-
tion delays are likely to persist in infrastructure develop-
ment projects. However, recovery of schedule delay is a 
less researched area. This case research, using a two-stage 
inquiry modeled on the grounded theory, studied the 
schedule delay recovery during the execution phase of a 
brownfield airport construction project. The analyses gen-
erated contextual evidence and ambidexterity was found 
to be the key underlying phenomenon for successful 
recovery measures. The empirical learning was validated 
with literature and can be used by practitioners looking to 
institute schedule recovery measures.
Keywords: grounded theory, project ambidexterity, 
brownfield project, schedule delay recovery, airport con-
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1  Introduction
Delays in airport construction projects appear to be a 
common phenomenon globally (Table 1). Time overruns 
adversely affect the economic interests of all parties 
involved in airport development, creates congestion 
for airlines and hardship to passengers, and hinders 
streamlining of trade logistics and business. At the 
same time, there are examples of airport construction 
performance successes such as on-time reopening of 
Rome’s Fiumicino Runway 2 (Airport Council Interna-
tional 2013).
The Indian civil aviation sector has witnessed 
growth in passenger traffic over the last two decades 
and is expected to continue growing for at least another 
decade. According to the existing investment plans of 
airport operators, the passenger terminal capacity of 
all Indian airports put together will increase from 230 
million passengers per annum in 2012 to 370 million 
passengers per annum in 2017 (Planning Commission, 
Government of India, 2012). The five private airports at 
Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Bangalore, and Cochin are 
expected to handle 60% of this passenger traffic, with 
state-owned enterprise Airports Authority of India (AAI) 
handling the remainder.
To handle the growth in passenger and cargo 
traffic, the country needs simultaneous investments in 
(a) development of new airports (greenfield projects) 
in smaller towns and remote areas and (b) expansion 
and modernization of existing airports (brownfield 
projects). India has 456 airports and airstrips, of which 
about 180, need to be functional over the decade. 
While attractive private finance and increased alloca-
tion of public funds are important enabling factors for 
this large, countrywide program to take off, its ultimate 
success would depend on minimizing execution delays 
and cost overruns of sanctioned projects. Hence, the 
airport construction sector becomes an area of interest 
for this study.
2  Literature survey
Project performance evaluation and identification of 
success factors have been well researched (Pinto and 
Slevin 1987; Garvin 2007; Luu et al. 2008; Cooke-Davies 
2002; Dvir et al. 1998; Shenhar et al. 2002; Iyer and Jha 
2006). Specifically for construction projects, perfor-
mance measurement has been dominated by the con-
ventional measures of time, cost, and quality, together 
termed as the “iron triangle” (Atkinson 1999), and this 
includes a rapidly growing body of knowledge (Bassioni 
et al. 2004; Yin and Du 2008; Chan and Chan 2004; 
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Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; Cao and Hoffman 2011; Hwang 
et al. 2010; Toor and Ogunlana 2010; Walker and Shen 
2002; Jha and Iyer 2007).
Studies have shown that effective project plan-
ning is linked to achievement of project success (Yin 
and Du 2008; Zwikael and Globerson 2006). The rela-
tionship between project planning and project success 
was empirically analyzed using data from more than a 
hundred defense research-and-development projects 
in Israel (Dvir et al. 2003). The findings suggested that 
project success is positively correlated with the invest-
ment in requirement definition and development of 
technical specifications but insensitive to the level of 
implementation of management processes and proce-
dures. Infrastructure projects in developing countries 
are generally performed under higher levels of uncer-
tainty. The lack of both owner’s institutional experience 
and historical data on multiple similar projects leads 
to initial planning being based on expert opinion and 
rough estimates. Factors such as resource constraints, 
unpredictability of regulatory regimes, technology 
adoption challenges (if applicable), and capacity lim-
itations of teams add to the uncertainties while prepar-
ing long-gestation projects.
In practice, planning deficiencies are widely prev-
alent when infrastructure projects in developing coun-
tries are conceptualized and sanctioned. As construction 
of these projects begins, the deviations between initial 
plans and actual progress become noticeable, leading 
to schedule delays and disruptions, cost overruns, and 
sometimes disputes. Studies from developing coun-
tries show that construction projects can benefit from 
effective project planning, controlling, and monitoring 
(Frimpong et al. 2003).
The complex dynamics of projects requires consid-
eration of the impact of a portfolio of many (disparate) 
disruptions, which could be greater than the sum of 
the impacts from each disruption taken singly (Eden et 
al. 2000). The portfolio of disruption impacts result in 
effects that would probably not even occur if only one 
or two impacts had occurred. Moreover, such combina-
torial effects may not be realized immediately and makes 
it considerably more difficult for project managers to 
recover from schedule delays as they realize that no 
matter what they do, the costs keep spiraling and delays 
get worse (Eden et al. 2000). This sets up a far greater 
challenging environment for project managers to recover 
the schedule delays during execution.
2.1  Schedule recovery during execution
The world-renowned Hibernia gravity base structure 
(GBS) project experienced initial delays. No previous off-
shore concrete structure has had such complex geometry, 
in combination with very high rebar densities and strict 
tolerance requirements. By appropriate construction 
methods, constructability reviews, putting together a new 
effective international construction team, and application 
of total quality management, the GBS project was turned 
around, and the concrete works were completed on sched-
ule and within budget (Nyborg and Bjorlo 1997). Another 
study, taking the example of a university building con-
struction project, has proposed a systems dynamics model 
Tab. 1: Examples of recent airport construction delays across the world*.
Serial No. City Country Description
1 Dhaka Bangladesh New greenfield airport land acquisition issues resulting in non-commencement of project
2 Muscat Oman Delays due to design modifications 
3 Brandenburg Germany 6-year delay (original opening plan 2010, expected 2016); cost overrun of €1.2 billion; €80 
million litigation for poor planning
4 Quito Ecuador 18-month delay; renegotiation, dispute resolution
5 Santiago Chile Re-tendering, quantum of delay to be ascertained
6 Malaga Spain Environment clearance delays; change in plans
7 Durban South Africa Renovation required within 2 years due to poor design and restricted access
8 Zagreb Croatia 10-year planning; year-long tendering in 2011; construction started May 2014; expected 
completion December 2016; optimistic schedule 
9 Doha Qatar 6-month delay in opening to decide the main contractor becoming the airport operator
10 Islamabad Pakistan 70% behind schedule, audit detected irregularity
11 New Khartoum Sudan Multiyear delay to finalize finances (Sudan suffered loss in State revenues due to partition)
12 Campinas City Brazil Unsafe working conditions; construction delay 
*Note: Data source: Airport Council International.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 2/22/17 1:36 PM
 Iyer and Banerjee, Project ambidexterity in a brownfield airport project   3
for schedule recovery from design errors (Han et al. 2013). 
While concluding that their model helped project manag-
ers better understand the dynamics of design errors and 
effectively recover delayed schedule, the researchers sug-
gested further verification for generalization.
In another work, a team of operations research-
ers classified uncertainties in project management into 
two: one that is stochastic in nature and another that is 
unique, entailing hard-to-predict events of large conse-
quence and which cause disruptions (Zhu et al. 2005). 
The latter uncertainties, difficult to deal with, are tradi-
tionally resolved by the experience and skill of the project 
manager, often resulting in suboptimal decisions. The 
researchers attempted to model the “recovery problem” 
arising out of the second type of uncertainty by focusing 
on the resource-constrained project scheduling problem. 
Though the work provided a new way of viewing and 
resolving disruptions as a project unfolds, their proce-
dures were not tested on real instances.
Besides these, we could not find other studies of how 
schedule delay recovery has been attempted during exe-
cution of large infrastructure projects. It may be that many 
cases of recovery might not have been systematically ana-
lyzed and published. As a result, this largely remains an 
unexplored domain.
3  Study objectives
Although there could be apparent similarities in managing 
scheduling problems between projects with small delays 
and the ones that must be handled after a disruption, the 
project management approaches would be different. A 
new paradigm of project management needs to emerge for 
recovering delayed and disrupted projects, with the simul-
taneous objectives of minimizing the cost of handling the 
disruptions and instituting new measures to get back the 
project on track as soon as possible. At times, disruptions 
shift priorities, requiring new options to be considered in 
the recovery process. All these need project managers to 
take decisions in a far more expeditious manner than they 
would otherwise do and to continually trade off good, 
well-thought decisions with those that need to be taken at 
that hour to speed up the recovery process to avoid further 
difficulties.
Project managers could benefit if a wider body of 
research knowledge and harvested learning existed, 
drawn from cases that were recovered from delays and 
disruptions. The overarching goal of this article is to 
study schedule recovery measures instituted in delayed 
infrastructure development projects and to understand 
whether any learning or practice can be generalized for 
adoption by practitioners. Emanating from this goal are 
the following research objectives:
(a) Develop a structured model of managerial inquiry 
into projects that face significant schedule delays and 
disruptions; and
(b) Study schedule delay recovery during execution to 
understand any underlying phenomenon that could 
be adopted as a model of practice.
The above objectives prompted us to understand the 
concept of ambidexterity and its relevance to this study. 
Though Robert Duncan first coined the term organiza-
tional ambidexterity in 1976, the seminal work of James 
March (1991) is credited to have generated interest in 
organizational ambidexterity research. His work con-
cluded that an organization needs to exploit its existing 
competencies to ensure proficiency while also exploring 
new solutions and adapting to the novelty of the situation.
Research to understand project ambidexterity is at 
a nascent stage. Moving beyond the current dominant 
focus of conventional time management practices in pro-
jects, this study is structured to understand the under-
lying phenomenon of schedule delay recovery in signif-
icantly delayed and disrupted projects. Such underlying 
phenomena, if they exist, can intuitively be expected to 
simultaneously exploit past learning and explore new 
frontiers of achievement possibilities to recover schedule 
delays and, hence, are likely to be in line with ambidex-
terity thinking.
The following sections set out the research method-
ology: two-stage project management inquiry models to 
analyze the case of an Indian airport brownfield construc-
tion project, for which schedule recovery measures were 
successfully instituted. The findings from the inquiry are 
subsequently validated with literature and conclusions 
are drawn.
4  Research methodology
4.1   Adoption of case study as the 
research method
The case research methodology is a powerful technique to 
study systems in their natural settings. This methodology 
provides unique advantages, whereby the phenomenon 
does not get isolated from its context, thus allowing the 
researchers to understand how organizational behav-
ior and processes are influenced by the organizational 
and environmental contexts (Yin 2003). Other eminent 
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researchers have also found it to be powerful in allow-
ing both researchers and practitioners to study systems 
in their natural settings, learn about the state of the art, 
and generate theories from practice (Benbasat et al. 1987). 
The case study approach has thus emerged as a widely 
accepted research technique.
Major projects of Indian state-owned enterprises with 
outlays of more than INR 1,500 million (approximately 
USD 25 million) suffer significant overruns and disrup-
tions (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementa-
tion, Government of India, 2014). Land acquisition issues 
and delays in environment clearances affect greenfield 
development projects. In comparison, brownfield rede-
velopment and/or expansion projects have fewer such 
issues. Furthermore, in a land-scarce country such as 
India, where significant infrastructure still needs to be 
built up, brownfield redevelopment projects can provide 
a range of economic, social, and environmental benefits 
(Zhu et al. 2009).
While there are a large number of delayed projects in 
India, very few such projects institute systematic meas-
ures for schedule recovery. In another study (Iyer and 
Banerjee 2016), the researchers had conducted a prelim-
inary survey of state-owned delayed infrastructure pro-
jects, each having an outlay of more than USD 200 million. 
Though each one was a prestigious project, none of these 
projects had instituted systematic schedule recovery 
measures. Hence, it was understood that the number of 
delayed projects that would have instituted such schedule 
recovery measures would be limited and would need the 
research team to develop a specific inquiry model for stud-
ying the identified project.
At this stage, the research team deliberated on the 
option of adopting either a conventional structured ques-
tionnaire survey that could capture the opinion of the 
associated actors or a detailed case research approach that 
flexibly builds up an inquiry model using the grounded 
theory (GT). While the opinion survey-based approach 
would be amenable to analysis using statistical tools, 
thereby easing generalization, it stood the risk of not cap-
turing critical issues and nuances that could be embed-
ded in the natural settings of this case. The researchers 
chose the case study approach as (a) they themselves were 
not aware of all facets of the research problem to enable 
them to prepare structured survey instruments that could 
comprehensively capture all necessary dimensions, and 
(b) the respondents were likely to respond only to the 
questions asked and might not proactively elaborate any 
missing areas, which the authors thought could require 
further research. Hence, a case research approach that 
would enable systematic analysis of how the systems 
interacted and worked in their natural context was consid-
ered appropriate. This was also expected to bring forward 
new managerial insights, which could form the basis for 
generation of theories from practice and get adopted in 
future.
4.2  Choice of GT to generate case data
Glaser and Strauss (1967) were the original proponents of 
the GT as a qualitative social research technique. There-
after, in a seminal work, Eisenhardt (1989) synthesized GT 
with other contemporary works to propose a methodology 
of within-case and cross-case analyses to build theory 
from case studies. A subsequent version of the GT was 
proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998), who used both 
inductive and deductive thinking on open-coded granular 
textual data for systematized generation of theory. Since 
then, researchers have used GT for descriptive and explor-
atory case studies, though it is still not widely prevalent as 
a combined research method (Lehmann 2010; Barrett and 
Sutrisna 2009; Krueger et al. 2014; Coakes and Elliman 
2011). Although the original GT approach prescribed a 
strict inductive way of generating theory from empiri-
cal data, subsequent researchers have criticized it for 
this pure emergent procedure and advocated combining 
empirically driven inductive analysis of case studies with 
preexisting theory-driven deductive analysis to effectively 
integrate knowledge and develop synthesized theory 
(Goldkuhl and Cronholm 2003).
Taking cue from this philosophy, the researchers 
adopted the approach of the original GT in this study to 
collect empirical project case data through open coding 
and then inductively grouping them through selective 
coding. This was then combined with the established the 
Project Management Institute (PMI) framework (Project 
Management Institute 2013) knowledge areas, along with 
its construction extension (Project Management Institute 
2007) to develop the anchors. The GT approach followed 
in this work (Table 2) has been adopted in other recent 
studies (Iyer and Banerjee 2015; 2016).
4.3  Overall research approach
The study begins by a holistic assessment of the entire 
case. It then proceeds to develop a two-stage project man-
agement inquiry. The first stage of inquiry makes use of 
the PMI framework and shortlists knowledge areas for 
further study. The second stage of inquiry, modeled on the 
GT approach, is then constructed to analyze constraints 
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and causality, with variants for brownfield (redevelop-
ment and/or extension) projects. The overall research 
approach is depicted in Figure 1.
5  Case summary
The status of nine construction projects that were in pro-
gress as on March 31, 2011, at different Indian airports is 
presented in Table 3.
As seen from Table 3, the construction of the Integrated 
Passenger Terminal Building at the Netaji Subhas Chandra 
Bose International (NSCBI) Airport, Kolkata, was the single 
largest airport construction project of the AAI, which was 
then under progress and had reported a delay of 3 months. 
At project conception, it was also thought that by manag-
ing such a complex brownfield extension project, the AAI 
would improve its project execution capability.
Prior to commissioning of the Integrated Passenger 
Terminal Building in 2013, the NSCBI Airport, Kolkata, 
had separate domestic and international passenger termi-
nal buildings. Around 2005, the international passenger 
terminal building was beginning to become overcrowded, 
requiring expansion and provision of more passenger 
amenities. The expansion and modernization plan for the 
international passenger terminal building was drawn up. 
Around the same time, permitting low-cost airlines’ oper-
ations in the Indian aviation sector saw a dramatic rise of 
domestic fliers. This accelerated the pace of overcrowd-
ing at the domestic terminal building at NSCBI Airport, 
Kolkata. While the combined terminals’ capacity was only 
5 million passengers annually, during April 2011 to March 
2012 alone, NSCBI Airport, Kolkata, served 10.3 million 
passengers. About 85% of these passengers were domes-
tic fliers.
Anticipating exponential growth in domestic fliers, 
the AAI had conceptualized an expansion plan for the 
domestic terminal in 2006 as a separate, but concurrent, 
exercise along with the expansion of the international 
passenger terminal building. Subsequently, in 2007, the 
AAI saw the logic of resource optimization benefits by 
amalgamating these exercises and constructing a new 
Integrated Passenger Terminal Building by redevelop-
ment of available land within the airport premises (about 
25% of this land was marshy, with a storm water pond 
of maximum depth of 3  m) to serve both international 
and domestic destinations. This led to the conceptual-
ization of an Integrated Passenger Terminal Building at 
NSCBI, Kolkata, designed to handle 20 million passen-
gers annually. It was expected that the current capacity 
would be sufficient to cater to passenger traffic at least 
until 2020.
5.1  Salient features of the project
The airport’s new integrated passenger terminal is a 
wide, V-shaped structure spread over 233,000  sq.m. 
(2,510,000  sq.ft.) It has two-tier operations for arrivals 
Tab. 2: Stages of the GT* study adopted for this research.
Stage Purpose of the stage
Open coding Collection of granular text data, such as those from stakeholder interviews, project records. Identified data are tagged 
and sorted by key points, which have been termed “open codes”.
Selective coding Collection of open codes similar in concept, which allowed the data to be grouped into “anchors”
Categories Broad groups of similar concepts that are used to generate theory
Theory A collection of similar explanations that explain the subject of the research
*GT = grounded theory.
Fig. 1: Overall research approach. PMBOK = Project Management 
Body of Knowledge; PMI = Project Management Institute.
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and departures, facilitating easy flow of passengers from 
entrance to boarding (Figure 2).
The new five-level terminal is served by an elevated 
890 m roadway leading to the departure facilities, with two 
lanes to five lanes in front of the new integrated passenger 
terminal. It contains 128 check-in counters that utilize the 
common user terminal equipment (CUTE) technology and 
has 78 immigration counters and 12 customs counters. Pas-
senger lounges are provided by the airlines, and the termi-
nal is equipped with 18 aerobridges and a further 57 remote 
parking bays. The state-of-the-art, in-line baggage handling 
system is capable of providing Level-5 security screening. 
The interior concept is inspired from the works of Nobel 
laureate Rabindranath Tagore (national poet of India).
5.2  Project approval
The project for construction of a new Integrated Passen-
ger Terminal Building was sanctioned by the Government 
of India on August 5, 2008, with an outlay of INR 19,425 
million (USD 320 million). The estimated cost was revised 
to INR 23,250 million (USD 385 million) to include mul-
tiple site preparation activities, such as relocation and 
diversion works in the brownfield redevelopment area. 
An international architect, who had worked earlier with 
national design firms and was earlier engaged for the 
domestic and international passenger terminal building 
expansion works for other AAI projects, was chosen for 
this project.
Tab. 3: Status of construction projects in airports operated by the AAI* (as on March 31, 2011).
No. Location Project name Project value 
(INR§, millions)
Physical work  
completion 
Time overrun (as on 
March 31, 2011)
1 Ahmedabad Construction of new International Terminal  
Building
2,909 100% (just 
 commissioned)
1 month
2 Chennai Development of Terminal Building and pavement 
works 
5,350 27% No delay reported
3 Chennai Development of Kamaraj Domestic Terminal  
Phase-2, and expansion of Anna International 
Terminal Building
12,730 64% Delay reported, but 
not quantified
4 Chennai Extension of secondary runway, construction  
of taxi tracks
2,328 99.5% No delay reported
5 Chennai Construction of RCC†/prestressed concrete  
bridge across the River Adyar 
2,280 99% No delay reported
6 Kolkata Construction of Integrated Passenger  Terminal 
Building at Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose 
 International (NSCBI) Airport
23,250 63% 3 months’ delay
7 Gangtok New airport at Pakyong near Gangtok 2,643 38% 17 months’ delay
8 Goa Construction of new International Terminal  
Building
3,300 16% Delay reported, but 
not quantified
9 Multiple locations GAGAN‡ Project (the AAI in collaboration with  
the Indian Space Research Organization,  
for satellite-based navigation)
3,936 62.15% No delay reported
*AAI = the Airports Authority of India; §INR = Indian rupee; †RCC = reinforced cement concrete; ‡GAGAN = GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation.
Fig. 2: Overview of the main terminal of the Netaji Subhas Chandra 
Bose International Airport at Kolkata, India.
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The consortium of Thailand-based Italian-Thai Devel-
opment Public Company Limited and ITD Cementation 
India Limited was awarded the work in October 2008, 
with a completion period of 30  months and additional 
3 months for the first monsoon, totaling 33 months. The 
construction supervision consultant was appointed later, 
5 months after commencement of construction.
5.3   Construction progress and 
commissioning
As observed by Shami and Kanafani (1997), renovation 
projects in airports are complex because operations need 
to be minimally disturbed. This constrains the perfor-
mance of construction in terms of scheduling, cost man-
agement, safety, security, quality, and regulations.
Though construction at the NSCBI Airport com-
menced on November 5, 2008, the project progress was 
delayed primarily due to AAI’s inability to clear multiple 
land encumbrances of the operational facilities within 
the project area and hand it over for construction. While 
some of these facilities were relocated and encumbrances 
were cleared as the work progressed, one of the facilities 
that were falling in Zone 1 of the new terminal was cleared 
almost 2.5 years after the start of construction works. In the 
meantime, as a fallback option, the project management 
team contemplated bifurcation of the major portion of 
the terminal work into (a) Phase 1, comprising Zones 2–6, 
which was nearly 80% of the covered area, along with the 
approach and exit roads, and car parking facilities, tar-
geted for completion by July 2012; and, (b) Phase  2, the 
balance portion comprising Zone 1, which was signifi-
cantly delayed, targeted for completion by March 2013. 
This would ensure commissioning the major part of the 
new terminal, thereby easing massive overcrowding at the 
existing terminal buildings.
However, schedule recovery measures were put in 
place for the entire work, i.e., from Zone 1 to Zone 6 as 
if they were part of a single phase. The integrated ter-
minal building was inaugurated on January 20, 2013, 
by the Honorable President of India. The new terminal 
was opened to passengers from March 10, 2013, and the 
project was declared commissioned on March 25, 2013, 
after about 53 months from the date of commencement of 
construction.
NSCBI Airport, Kolkata, has bagged the “Second Best 
Engineering Marvel for the year 2013”, conferred by the 
magazine Engineering Watch; “Excellence in Built Envi-
ronment 2013” award from the Indian Building Congress; 
“Best Improvement Award, First Place – Asia Pacific” for 
the year 2013–14 conferred by Airports Council Interna-
tional; and the “Vishwakarma Award 2014” under cat-
egory of Best Construction Projects, conferred by Con-
struction Industry Development Council under Planning 
Commission, Government of India.
6  First-stage inquiry
The first-stage inquiry was intended to shortlist applicable 
knowledge areas of project management for the next stage 
of inquiry, as suggested in the GT approach. The logic for 
dropping or short-listing a knowledge area is discussed in 
the following sections.
6.1  Findings
•	 Scope management: Being a brownfield project with 
multiple site constraints, as well as planning and 
design delays, managing the scope within the budget 
was a challenge. At one point, due to delayed handover 
of a portion of the site, it was contemplated by the AAI 
that Zone 1 of the Terminal would be built later and 
the airport would be commissioned by completing the 
works for Zones 2–6. This interim contemplation was 
driven by considerations to operationalize about 80% 
of the passenger terminal building. Subsequently, as 
the entire work was taken up for execution as single 
phase, with no change in the scope, this was not taken 
forward to the second-stage inquiry.
•	 Time management: The AAI had proposed a longer 
schedule of 42  months during project conception, 
but the proposed schedule got curtailed in stages as 
the proposed project moved through multiple layers 
of approval. Finally, the original schedule estimate 
was recorded as 33  months, though this was inade-
quate for the construction of a facility of this size and 
complexity. This was a typical example of optimism 
bias (Flyvbjerg 2008; Siemiatycki 2008) during plan-
ning. After commencement of construction works, a 
committee was formed, which assessed the reason-
ableness of the schedule. The committee concluded 
that the completion period of 33 months was unreal-
istic and 45  months was a more realistic completion 
time period. With the project being commissioned in 
53  months, this meant an overall delay of 8  months. 
A detailed study revealed that the project could have 
been delayed even more, but some schedule delay was 
recovered during execution. Hence, this was taken 
forward to the second-stage inquiry.
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•	 Cost management: The project was delivered within 
the stipulated budget, and hence this factor was not 
taken forward to the second-stage inquiry. However, a 
learning point emerged on budget items that need to 
be included for site preparation while preparing esti-
mates of future brownfield projects.
•	 Quality management: This study considered con-
formance to specification as a measure of quality and 
found examples of rework that was carried out by the 
contactors at their risk and cost. The impact of rework 
components got absorbed within the adverse sched-
ule variance, if any, and was not separately tracked 
during execution. Thus, it was concluded that the 
rework components did not cause any separate delay 
or extra cost to the owner. This was a learning point. 
However, as time management was already selected 
for further study, this area was not taken forward to 
the second-stage inquiry.
•	 Human resource management: While PMI recog-
nizes human resources management as a knowledge 
area, a large engineering construction project such as 
this deploys multiple resources of labour, equipment, 
tools, and tackles. Adequate availability, appropriate 
utilization, and the knowledge to effectively manage 
all these resources collectively contribute to project 
success. This corroborates with the resource-based 
view (Barney and Arikan 2001; Killen et al. 2012; 
Tarafdar and Gordon 2007), and hence the ambit of 
study for this area was extended to cover all project 
resources. It was termed as resource management and 
selected for the second-stage inquiry.
•	 Communications management: Initial study 
revealed that communications within internal actors 
and with external stakeholders were managed reason-
ably well. Periodic reporting by project consultants 
strengthened this process. Hence, this was not taken 
forward to the second-stage inquiry.
•	 Risk management: Most risks were identified during 
planning and hence can be classified as “known” risks. 
An example is the provision of an additional 3 months 
of time for the first monsoon within the project sched-
ule. Monsoons are especially heavy in Eastern India 
and affect excavation work, which gets scheduled at 
the beginning of construction works. However, some 
of these “known” risks turned into “unknown” risks 
with unpredictable schedule consequences as the 
project entered the execution stage. An example is the 
schedule impact of AAI’s inability to make available 
the whole parcel of encumbrance-free land for con-
struction. This delay introduced risks and uncertain-
ties even within the defined scope and soon resulted 
in schedule delays, which became hard to recover. 
Hence, this was taken forward to the second-stage 
inquiry.
•	 Procurement management: Contract packages were 
centrally awarded by the AAI following appropriate 
process at the conclusion of the planning stage. The 
engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) 
lead contractor submitted the baseline procurement 
and construction works program for review on Novem-
ber 26, 2008. It included the following:
 i.  Passenger terminal building (approximately 
223,000 sq.m.) comprising the international and 
domestic terminals, including pile foundations, 
as well as all civil and finishing works;
 ii. Car park building;
 iii.  Elevated road in front of the passenger terminal 
building;
 iv. Aluminium works, façade, and glazing system;
 v. Profile roof sheeting system;
 vi.  Internal and external electrification, lighting, 
and so on;
 vii.  Power supply including diesel generator (DG) 
sets;
 viii. Central air-conditioning;
 ix. Elevators, escalators, and travelators;
 x.  Fire-fighting systems (such as automatic 
hydrant and sprinkler system).
The final scope of the work for the main contractor was 
amended to include all major civil and electrical works 
but exclude the works for aluminum works, façade, and 
glazing systems. Moreover, the baggage handling system, 
sewerage treatment plant, passenger boarding bridges, 
building automation system, and information technology 
(IT) packages were procured through separate contracts. 
The procurement, fabrications, and deliverables were 
planned until October 26, 2010, which was subsequently 
revised thrice to cater to delays in site handover and to 
match the progress of construction works. Procurement 
administration during execution stage followed standard 
procedures. Hence, it was not considered for second-stage 
inquiry.
•	 Stakeholder management: A project such as this has 
multiple stakeholders, which continue to expand as 
it moves through its development life cycle: planning 
(mostly internal and regulatory stakeholders) to con-
struction (mix of internal, regulatory, and some exter-
nal agencies) to commissioning (heterogeneous mix of 
internal, regulatory, and proportionately larger base of 
external agencies, as well as the public at large). The 
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 2/22/17 1:36 PM
 Iyer and Banerjee, Project ambidexterity in a brownfield airport project   9
stakeholder management processes across the project 
life cycle were appropriately executed; this factor was 
taken forward for second-stage inquiry.
•	 Safety management: The project area was cordoned 
off from the apron and other operational areas (both 
air and city sides). Construction staff and equipment 
safety measures were in place. Location of the opera-
tional aviation turbine fuel storage area near the con-
struction site (on the fringes of Zone 6) required addi-
tional safety measures during construction. However, 
as the overall safety record of the project was good, 
this was not taken forward to the second-stage inquiry.
•	 Environment management: Water bodies and 
natural aquifers are protected; environmental clear-
ance for filling them up is likely to take time. However, 
no environmental clearance was necessary for filling 
up of pond inside the project area. This was identified 
as an advantage for this project. Other clearances were 
obtained during project planning and hence this area 
was not taken up in the second-stage inquiry.
•	 Financial management: The AAI released funds 
commensurate with progress of work. In turn, the 
main contractor released funds to the subcontractors 
and equipment suppliers. More often than not, if this 
funds flow cycle gets broken, schedule performance 
gets affected through the affected actor(s). There was 
no such finding, and hence this area was not picked 
up for further study.
•	 Claim management: Though claim resolution is a 
PMI closure process, in practice and also as seen in 
this project, execution of works deviating from base-
line project plan need concurrent handling of claims 
during execution. As the execution stage of this project 
had multiple deviations from the baseline project plan, 
this knowledge area was considered for further study. 
It may be mentioned that both the AAI and the con-
tractors demonstrated commitment to avoid disputes 
that would result in stoppage of work while continuing 
to work on claims on a parallel track. This was taken 
forward to the second-stage inquiry.
•	 Integration management: Young and Poon (2013) 
commented that methodologies such as PRINCE2 
and PMI (Project Management Body of Knowledge 
[PMBOK]) have been found to be mature but ineffec-
tive without project governance and top management 
support. Following this, both project governance and 
top management support were examined in this stage 
of inquiry.
A recent study on large multi-stakeholder infrastruc-
ture projects shows project governance shifting toward 
(a)  emphasizing network-level mechanisms, such as 
self- regulation within the project and (b) taking an open- 
systems view to successfully manage such projects in 
complex and challenging institutional environments 
(Ruuska et  al. 2011). The commissioning stage of this 
project was an example of such a challenging institutional 
environment, wherein the complexity of decision making 
in a multi-stakeholder environment attained its peak 
within the project life cycle. Hence, this knowledge area 
was chosen for second-stage inquiry.
Top management support was crucial to achieve 
success in this project. For example, a high degree of 
coordination was needed between project activities and 
maintenance of existing airport operations, such as traffic 
diversions, work permits, executing utility rerouting 
works, transitioning, and commissioning. In this case, the 
airport Director himself held the charge of the project. A 
common, on-site top executive ensured necessary support 
during the execution stage and streamlined interdiscipli-
nary coordination between projects and operations. It is 
a key learning from this project and can be considered a 
good practice for similar other projects.
6.2  Conclusions from first-stage inquiry
As discussed earlier, six knowledge areas – namely, inte-
gration management, time management, resource man-
agement, risk management, stakeholder management, 
and claim management, were shortlisted for building the 
second-stage inquiry and study of schedule delay recovery 
measures. In addition, lessons from knowledge areas such 
as cost management and quality management were noted 
for consideration during development of conclusions.
7  Second-stage inquiry
The second-stage inquiry was intended to identify and 
categorize constraints in the performance of shortlisted 
knowledge areas. The approach and logic followed in the 
process are discussed in the following sections.
Following a GT approach, open coding was under-
taken to collect granular text data through interviews 
of key project executives (in civil, mechanical-electri-
cal-and-plumbing [MEP], and planning divisions) of the 
AAI and the deputy project manager of the EPC contrac-
tor; site visits, study of progress reports, schedule vari-
ance analyses, as well as inspection of drawings and other 
project records. Open coding identified 10 key constraints, 
which were grouped into a core of seven “anchors” similar 
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in concept in terms of situations, constraints, and sched-
ule impacts. Three broad groups (termed “categories”) 
were then generated by aggregating these “anchors” 
based on similarity in findings (Table 4).
The open-coded constraints were ranked, using a con-
cordance approach among the AAI project executives and 
contractor representatives. The criteria for ranking the 
constraints were as follows: (a) those that had an impact 
on schedule performance and could be quantified; (b) 
those that demonstrate evidence of impact on schedule 
but could not be quantified; and (c) those with descend-
ing order of criticality and potential to impact schedule 
but were effectively managed. A summary of this analysis 
is presented in Table 5.
As the next step, the top-ranked five constraints, which 
affected (or had the potential to affect) the project sched-
ule, were studied to understand how the AAI managed 
them following the five shortlisted PMI knowledge areas, 
namely, integration management, time management, 
resource management, stakeholder management, and 
claim management, discussed in the previous section.
8   Analysis of findings of 
 second-stage inquiry
8.1   Site constraint (land encumbrance)
Brownfield projects are seldom simple, straightforward 
development efforts (Harrell et al. 2004). For a project of 
this magnitude and complexity, designed to be built on 
international standards, handing over encumbrance-free 
land within the project premises to the contractor was a 
critical prerequisite for commencement of construction. 
This was a “known” risk at the planning stage. However, 
an extraordinary delay in handing over the land parcels 
turned out to be a crucial shortcoming on the part of 
the AAI, creating uncertainty in activity and schedule 
management, thereby escalating it into the realm of an 
“unknown” risk. Consequential disruptions had a dispro-
portionately wider adverse effect on the overall project 
performance when compared to all other constraints.
8.2   Relocating line maintenance building, 
its demolition and handover of site
Identification of an appropriate location to shift the line 
maintenance building took time and could have been 
done earlier through better decision making during 
planning. However, once the line maintenance staff had 
relocated, the AAI project team executed demolition 
works by mobilizing additional resources at their end and 
handed over the parcel of land to the main contractors 
to start construction works. For the entire works of Zones 
3 and 4, which were constrained due to maneuverability 
issues and had access restrictions (being close to existing 
airport operational areas), the AAI and the main contrac-
tor’s team connected well and worked with a high degree 
of alignment between them, with the contractor showing 
commitment and adaptability to mobilize additional 
resources to avail windows of schedule recovery oppor-
tunities and the AAI reciprocating by providing as much 
facilitation as possible within contractual provisions 
and operational constraints. Such mutual adaptation to 
achieve the common goal demonstrates ambidexterity 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004). Though the handover for 
this area (Zones 3 and 4) was delayed by 1 year, the net 
delay attributable to this site constraint was finally recov-
ered and was assessed at 2 months. This delay would have 
affected the completion of Phase 1 if the AAI had pursued 
a bifurcated completion approach for Phase 1 (covering 
Zones 2–6 by July 2012) and Phase 2 (covering only Zone 
1 by March 2013).
8.3   Identification of a location for the 
service building and sewerage 
treatment plant
There was delay in identification of the locations for struc-
tures near the Integrated Terminal Building. While some 
delay could not have been avoided because of the uncer-
tainty in finalizing locations for other relocations, it could 
have been done earlier through better decision making at the 
planning stage, compared to the 1 year it took. In this period, 
the excavated earth from the pond area, where piling was in 





Knowledge of existing utilities network/
layout
Reclamation of land/brownfield 
 contamination
Cascading planning deficiency Process constraint
Complex, multidisciplinary  
decision-making environment Governance constraint
Organization procedural environment 
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Tab. 5: Description of key constraints, anchors, and categories, as well as their effects on project schedule.
Description of situation and constraint Anchor and category Effect on project and consequential delays Rank
Shifting of electrical substation; permission for 
 demolition of link building. These were critical pieces 
of operational infrastructure located in Zone 1 of the 
 proposed Integrated Terminal Building. 
Anchor: land 
 encumbrance;  
category: site constraint
Link building area was handed over on 
April 1, 2011, about 29 months after 
 commencement of construction. 
1
Shifting of line maintenance building and motor transport 
workshop and permission for demolition. These were 
operational facilities located in Zones 3 and 4 of the 
proposed Integrated Terminal Building
Anchor: land 
 encumbrance;  
category: site constraint
Line maintenance building area was 
handed over on October 20, 2009, 
about 1 year after commencement of 
 construction.
2
Service area, its building, and the underground sewerage 
treatment plant were not defined in the initial plan drawings. 
Anchor: land encumbrance; 
category: site constraint
The locations were finalized 1 year after 
commencement of construction.
3
Inclusion of separate architect/design consultant for 
Domestic and International terminals, with no interface 
between the consultants, resulted in major disorder when 
the structure was designed as an integrated terminal. 
Anchor: cascading 
 planning deficiency; 
 category: process 
 constraint
Dissimilar architectural concept and design 
outputs with convergence disagreements 
between consultants resulted in time 
loss. This time loss affected the schedule 
 performance but could not be segregated 
and quantified in the study.
4
(a) The AAI had no prior experience of such a large 
 commissioning exercise since its inception in 1994.
(b) Transition of all operations staff, airlines, passenger, 
security, health organization, customs and passport 
control services. Operations from existing terminal 




 environment;  
category:  governance 
constraint
Any glitch in transition would delay project 
commissioning. Other high-profile interna-
tional airports experienced commissioning 
fiascos. Meticulous planning and rigorous 
trails ensured smooth transition, and hence 
this was picked up for detailed study.
5
Without restricting appropriate access for existing airport 
operations, there was limited space available to be given 
to the contractor for setting up the fabrication yard, Con-
crete batching plant and its operations, and equipment 
storage. Maneuverability of equipment and vehicle were 
also constrained within the project area. 
Anchor: access restriction; 
category: site constraint
Lack of proper road network within the 
project area led to equipment underutili-
zation and hindered movement of project 
resources. This, however, finally did not 
cause project delay.
6
Rerouting of existing operational utilities, services, 
and communication cables from the project area in the 
absence of their detailed drawings. Most of these were 
serving the existing airport, and any inadvertent damage 
during excavation or other works would be potentially 
disruptive for airport operations.
Anchor: knowledge of 
existing utilities  
network/layout;  
category: site constraint
While this was a “known unknown”, it 
led to uncertainty with potential to affect 
schedule. This was managed by the AAI 
with additional efforts and emerged as a 
learning point from this study.
7
(a) There was a storm water pond in the project area, 
which needed to be filled up as a part of site 
 preparation activity.
(b) Rerouting of inlet to pond and its discharge into the 
existing drainage system of the civic authority 
Anchor: reclamation 
of land/brownfield 
 contamination;  
category: site constraint
Though pond filling activity was planned, 
the rerouting of the inlet to pond was not 
initially budgeted. This was included as 
a revision, but finally, it did not delay the 
project.
8
Location of operational aviation turbine fuel storage tank 
area near the project construction site (on the fringes of 
Zone 6). This required the following:
(a) implementation of additional safety measures during 
construction
(b) maintenance of access roads for tankers  
approaching from the city side to the fuel storage 
tank area throughout the construction period.
Anchor: land 
 encumbrance;  
category: site constraint
Efforts to get the fuel oil marketing firm to 
relocate their fuel storage tanks did not 
materialize and needed repeated changing 
of temporary access roads to allow tankers 
to reach the fuel storage tank area. No 
delay in project schedule.
9
Lengthy organizational procedure for effecting any 
change in contract, such as Bill of Material, specifica-
tions, quantities, services, and other change orders that 





Layouts or numbers were required to be 
shared and agreed with the contractor 
to know the flexibility on the  availability 
of material or substitutes and their 
 construction viability before implementing 
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progress, had been moved to this area and required reshift-
ing. This duplication of work could have been avoided. 
However, the AAI project team recovered this schedule 
delay through additional mobilization of resources, round–
the-clock working, and resequencing of activities. Finally, 
this caused no net delay to the overall project schedule.
8.4   Demolition of link building and 
handover of site
The uniquely situated city of Kolkata serves as an aviation 
gateway between the seven land-locked North East Indian 
States and other Indian Sates, which otherwise are not 
well connected by road or rail and are serviced by limited 
number of flights. The link building served as an afforda-
ble transit accommodation for convenience air travelers to 
the North Eastern States. The impact of a demolition deci-
sion of the link building needed to be assessed beyond the 
project contours, and its approval was caught in proce-
dural and contextual delays. This shows that there was a 
need for a more comprehensive stakeholder consultation 
at the outset of such public infrastructure projects and 
working out acceptable alternate arrangements before 
commencement of execution works. Recent studies have 
shown how sociotechnical spaces across boundaries 
can be consultatively bridged to overcome barriers and 
provide better insights into their needs, values, and con-
cerns at an early date (Storvang and Clarke 2014).
The demolition was further complicated by the pres-
ence of an electrical substation, which serviced existing 
airport operations, within the link building premises. 
The AAI had to shift the substation by erecting and com-
missioning another substation outside the project area 
(which took nearly 1 year) to continue servicing existing 
airport operations. Finally, the link building was demol-
ished, and the site was handed over after about 29 months 
from the date of construction commencement. Besides 
creating access restrictions to continue working in other 
areas, the link building had held up construction of 36,818 
sq. m. floor area across all levels (about 16% of the total 
floor area). This factor singularly caused a major delay 
and disruption in this project.
Even before the entire construction site could be made 
available due to land encumbrances, piling work was 
commenced by the contractor. To facilitate movement of 
piling rigs, cranes, and dumpers, the AAI made a special 
effort to shift the gas bank of the operational restaurant in 
the existing domestic terminal building, which was very 
close to the construction works area.
Once the link building area was handed over, special 
efforts were made by the AAI and the contractor to expe-
dite and recover schedule delay to the extent possible. 
On the basis of the prior learning in managing execu-
tion of resource-intensive critical activities in the areas 
of Zones 2–6, activity related to erection of trusses was 
resequenced and prioritized indicating ambidexterity. 
Some specific examples of exploratory learning during 
the construction activities of Zones 2–6, which were 
exploited to achieve schedule efficiency in Zone 1, are 
given below:
•	 After fabrication and shifting of the roof truss segments 
from the fabrication yard to the site, the average time 
required from assembly to erection of each truss was 
35  days. With the learning experience and hands-on 
expertise of the erection team gained from the erection 
of 30 trusses in Zones 2–6, it was possible to reduce 
the time cycle to 29 days for each for the four trusses in 
Zone 1. This was possible by reducing the time taken 
for making arrangements for the temporary and ena-
bling works on steel and reinforced cement concrete 
(RCC) columns to facilitate the erection.
•	 From the learning experience of Zones 2–6, the loca-
tion of the two tower cranes erected in Zone 1 could be 
better planned. The utilization of the tower cranes was 
maximized with minimum hindrance to the casting of 
floor slabs. The dismantling of the tower cranes was 
also completed with least hindrance and less time.
•	 The false ceiling works at both the arrival and depar-
ture levels were specialized activities requiring work-
force skilled for quality and precision execution at 
ceiling levels of 9  m and 16  m (average) above their 
respective floor levels. The exploratory learning while 
executing similar work in the other zones resulted in 
knowledge that helped reduce defects and rework in 
Zone 1. Consequently, the same portions of work in 
Zone 1 took lesser time to complete.
•	 In the lower basement, there were interfacing issues 
between the main and the baggage handling system 
contractors during the execution of works in Zones 
2–6. This was related to the structural supports for 
the conveyor belts suspended from the ceiling. Reso-
lutions were explored and mutually agreed upon, and 
this knowledge helped better plan and execute the ser-
vices and utility lines in the basement ceiling in Zone 1 
without any hindrance.
Discussions with the AAI project team and the contractor 
revealed that the overall net delay could be contained to 
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7 months, attributed to recovery measures in spite of site 
constraint in Zone 1.
8.5  Validation with literature
One of the first ambidexterity studies on large, complex, 
engineering projects was on the USD 920 million Sutong 
Bridge construction project in China (Liu et al. 2012). The 
bridge, apart from its huge span, has the deepest bridge 
foundation piles (120  m) in the world. Its two 300.4  m 
towers rest on the world’s largest pier base (the pile cap), 
which is anchored on 131 friction piles cast deep into 
the riverbed. By studying the piling works of the Sutong 
Bridge project, the researchers concluded that ambidex-
terity was achieved during the life span of this complex 
engineering project. This was done by exploring new 
solutions in the first phase of the piling work after an 
initial setback and then exploiting the newly acquired 
knowledge to expeditiously complete the piling works. 
Similarly, in the NSCBI Airport construction project, 
it was seen that exploratory learning in Zones 2–6 was 
exploited to achieve schedule efficiency in Zone 1. This 
indicated ambidexterity.
8.6   Process constraint (cascading 
planning deficiency)
The earlier stand-alone expansion and modernization 
project for the international passenger terminal building, 
drawn up in the year 2006, had already engaged a national 
architectural design firm. The initial contractual disburse-
ment had happened, and the firm had commenced work. 
The AAI also had engaged another architectural design 
firm in the year 2007 for its earlier separate and stand-
alone expansion project for the domestic passenger ter-
minal, which was put on hold when the AAI decided to 
conceptualize the Integrated Passenger Terminal Building 
in that year.
The international architectural firm, chosen for the 
integrated terminal in 2008, had already forged a pre-bid 
partnership with the already appointed Indian design 
firm for modernization of the domestic terminal building. 
Thereafter, during the planning process of the Integrated 
Passenger Terminal Building, architects of the earlier 
stand-alone expansion and modernization of the interna-
tional passenger terminal building (engaged in the year 
2006) were requested to join the design team for the new 
project on mutually acceptable terms. This was primarily 
done to leverage the disbursement already made under 
their earlier contract, which otherwise could have been 
classified as infructuous expenditure according to public 
sector practices.
8.6.1   Lack of convergence between 
architect-designers
As found during the study, this arrangement of two 
architect-designer firms with dissimilar architectural 
concepts and design outputs working on an integrated 
terminal led to multiplicity of issues for the AAI and 
the contractors. This adversely affected project pro-
gress and possibly outweighed the savings made had 
the initial disbursement to one of the designers been 
declared as an infructuous expenditure. This has been 
categorized as a process-cascaded constraint, wherein 
decisions taken during preceding planning process 
group discussions become binding constraints on the 
succeeding execution process group working. Further-
more, this stands out as an example of an unidentified 
risk during the planning stage, which turned out into a 
schedule-threatening risk soon after construction com-
mencement.
Civil, architectural, and MEP activities require high 
level of interface and coordination among the actors 
(architect-designers, contractors, and consultants) and 
their activities. Independent interface drawings need to 
be developed to prevent dismantling and reworks. The 
issues must be resolved regularly with intensive interface 
meetings as demanded. Poor interface leads to time and 
cost overrun and claims by the contractor. Survey findings 
from Thailand on similar construction projects have also 
revealed that factors related to designers, contractors, 
and consultants were among the top problems (Toor and 
Ogunlana 2008).
In this project, good-for-construction (GFC) drawings 
were planned to be provided in complete within the first 
8 months of the project, which continued very late into the 
construction stage and did not include the baggage han-
dling system and the IT packages, generating clashes sub-
sequently. The total GFC drawings received on the project 
were 3,358, including revisions, of which civil (including 
structural steel) comprised 39.22%, architecture 34.70%, 
and MEP 26.08%. In total, 75.08% of the first issuance of 
GFC drawings were revised (this led to a total of 1,440 revi-
sions), indicating very low convergences between the two 
architect-designers before releasing the GFC drawings of 
the integrated terminal.
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Furthermore, the architect-designer responses to 
request for design and architectural information by the 
contractor were delayed. This cascaded into delayed 
submission of shop drawings by the contractor, and the 
approval of shop drawings was further delayed by the 
design consultants. Missing information and inadequate 
details had considerable effects on the progress of the 
project. There were 3,103 revisions submitted by the con-
tractor, which is 52.48% of the original submissions. Sub-
stantial revisions (totaling 2,635) were in structural steel, 
which was a major issue for preparing shop drawings.
8.7  Measures taken by the AAI
Under such uncertain conditions and delays that 
required schedule crashing, leaving even lesser time 
for completion of works, the lack of architect-designers’ 
representative on the project site to review design and 
provide quick on-site resolutions that were necessitated 
due to site constraints aggravated matters. In many 
cases, the AAI had to draw upon in-house, prior learning 
of experts to directly intervene and provide solutions to 
contractors, thereby expediting works. At the same time, 
the AAI simultaneously explored ways to work around 
site constraints that delayed the release of GFC drawings. 
In this context, the AAI took the lead across all stages of 
construction work to integrate the views of disagreeing 
architect-designers, thereby narrowing down areas of 
divergence. In the process, the AAI suggested multiple 
design and layout changes to make the structure efficient 
for optimal use.
8.7.1  Validation with literature
March (1991) conceptualized ambidexterity as organi-
zational learning in terms of exploitation (drawing from 
prior learning) and exploration (developing new solu-
tions), which were earlier considered to be competing for 
scarce organizational resources. Another research showed 
nine principles of “simultaneous management” to be the 
key to the execution of capital projects with excellence 
and speed (Laufer et al. 1996). While six of these principles 
pertained to planning and systems, three of the leadership 
and integration principles, namely, inward and outward 
leadership, multiphase integration, and multidisciplinary 
teams, were adapted by the AAI to overcome this con-
straint and recover schedule delays. Such “exploitation 
and exploration” and “simultaneous management” can 
be assessed as demonstration of ambidexterity.
8.8   Governance constraint (complex, 
multidisciplinary decision-making 
environment)
8.8.1  Criticality of this activity
Commissioning of such a large-scale Integrated Termi-
nal Building was the first-of-its-kind experience for the 
AAI. While this was a “known” risk, in the absence of any 
in-house hands-on prior experience within the AAI, no 
mitigation planning was done before commencement of 
construction. In India, the newly built Delhi Airport Ter-
minal-3 was commissioned in the year 2010, but it dealt 
with partial transition activities as some of the airlines 
continued their operations from the existing Terminal-1. 
The AAI was aware that the wider public perception of 
project success was dependent on achieving an inci-
dent-free commissioning on Airport Opening Day (AOD). 
Hence, it was critical for the AAI to demonstrate that it 
could orchestrate multiple stakeholders and govern them 
to work cohesively toward this common goal.
8.8.2  Measures taken by the AAI
To exploit prior learning available in India, the AAI facil-
itated a transition peer review, whereby representatives 
from the Delhi Airport Terminal-3 project were invited to 
share their experiences. A detailed transition work plan for 
the successful transitioning of people, processes, systems, 
and supplies was then drafted to ensure a smooth opening 
with uninterrupted operations in the new environment. 
Furthermore, as another learning measure, two actual 
arrival flights were taken through the new terminal in July 
and August of 2012 as a trial measure. All arrangements 
that a passenger would expect while passing through the 
terminal were trial-commissioned and the exercise was 
successful in a controlled environment. These systems 
were then subjected to rigorous testing over the next few 
months to iron out glitches.
Being aware that there would be no scope for on-the-
spot improvisation on AOD, the AAI took the lead to draft 
a set of standard operating procedures (SOPs). These were 
then reviewed by the airlines, the security agency, statu-
tory authorities, customs and immigration departments, 
and the airport health organization for operational suita-
bility, as well as their conformity with the laid-down rules 
and regulations before their adoption. The AAI realized 
that effective communication of SOPs to all stakeholders 
held the key to success and dedicated significant efforts 
in this direction.
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The AAI then developed an operational readiness, 
activation, and transition (ORAT) program to identify 
opportunities for improvement and corrective actions 
prior to AOD and, if necessary, resolve any conflict 
between the design and the intended operational usage. 
The AAI extended extensive assistance to all stakeholders 
to overcome the challenge of maintaining parallel sets 
of synchronized, operational systems at the existing and 
new terminals during transition. ORAT review meetings 
were held weekly to monitor progress and resolve issues 
through on-the-spot decisions for schedule compliance. 
Necessary statutory approvals from the Central and State 
Governments (passenger boarding bridges, security, 
power supply, DG set fuel storage, fire and emergency 
rescue, weights, and measures) were obtained on time – 
well before AOD.
Shifting of flights from the existing terminals to the 
new terminal commenced from March 10, 2013, and the 
entire process was completed by March 15, 2013. The 
collaborative approach-based ORAT ensured that the 
four essential factors in airport operations – passenger, 
airport, baggage, and aircraft – harmonized to ensure 
complete alignment of facilities, people, and processes for 
the successful launch of operations on time, on budget, 
and without incident.
8.8.3  Validation with literature
The problems faced by the Heathrow Terminal 5 on AOD, 
culminating in the cancellation of numerous flights and 
manual sorting of thousands of lost bags before being 
returned to their owners (Brady and Davies 2010), show 
that one of the best-planned high-technology construction 
efforts of recent times delivered within time and cost can 
go awry at the commissioning stage. The AAI was aware of 
the numerous problems the Heathrow Terminal 5 faced on 
AOD, and the NSCBI Airport’s Integrated Terminal faced 
none of these issues.
A business study on the “alignment” (exploitative 
qualities) and “adaptability” (explorative qualities) col-
lected data from 4,195 individuals in 41 business units 
and found a strong correlation between company perfor-
mance (dependent variable) and high levels of both align-
ment and adaptability (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004). The 
researchers termed this phenomenon as ambidexterity. 
Similarly, at the commissioning stage of this project, the 
AAI achieved high levels of alignment to integrate all stake-
holders toward the common goal of incident-free AOD and 
adaptability to a situation of contending demands under 
uncertainty, yet exploring new solutions. Hence, it can 
be concluded that the underlying phenomenon of AAI’s 
project governance was ambidexterity.
9  Summary and conclusions
It was quite likely that the execution stage of such a large 
brownfield extension project that began with deficiencies 
in the planning process would generate a set of dispa-
rate disruptions as soon as execution commenced. The 
combinatorial effect of these disruptions not only posed 
serious challenges to execution within budgets but threat-
ened to worsen the already-projected schedule delays. 
The two-stage inquiry model brought out and ranked the 
constraints with their impact on schedule delay. Case 
findings showed that the AAI worked with the simulta-
neous objectives of minimizing the impact of disruptions 
and instituting measures across multiple dimensions of 
the project to recover schedule delays. Though working 
in a state-owned enterprise environment, the AAI project 
managers took many good decisions in a far more system-
atic and expeditious manner than many of their peers in 
other similar enterprises to speed up the recovery process. 
The case findings also show that all recovery measures 
were instituted for every significant constraint/issue, 
having a balance of simultaneous exploitation of prior 
learning and exploration of new solutions. A summary of 
this assessment is given in Table 6.
It can thus be concluded that ambidexterity was 
the underlying phenomenon of significance in schedule 
recovery measures instituted by the AAI. The study of 
schedule recovery during the execution stage of delayed 
capital projects is a relatively less-researched area. The 
emphasis of previous studies has generally been on 
improving the planning processes to achieve project 
success. However, in practice, planning deficiencies are 
widely prevalent when construction projects (especially 
in developing countries) are conceptualized and sanc-
tioned. Executions of these projects are either delayed or 
get disrupted, in addition to facing cost overruns and dis-
putes. These projects need to be recovered. While some 
of the delay factors are related to land acquisition, reha-
bilitation, and environment clearances (especially for 
greenfield projects In India and many other developing 
countries), there are a large number of brownfield pro-
jects that do not have such challenges but still face inor-
dinate delays and disruptions.
Though case findings cannot be generalized to 
support any hypothesis, it can be a source for contex-
tual evidence and rich insights (Walker and Shen 2002). 
As this case shows, such projects can turn around their 
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performances during execution by improving their man-
agerial effectiveness through appropriate application 
of ambidexterity principles. This could be adopted as a 
model of good practice by practitioners looking to insti-
tute recovery measures in delayed and disrupted projects. 
This study considered a brownfield project; however, the 
inquiry models and analytical framework developed can 
be applied to greenfield projects as well. Future research 
could consider projects from other infrastructure sectors 
to help build a wider body of research knowledge to 
support project managers engaged in recovering delayed 
projects.
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